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11 Introduction
Empirical observations of short-run ‡uctuations in turnover and average prices as well as
price-turnover correlations on the second-hand housing market have lately attracted much
attention and led to both theoretical and empirical research.1 These empirical observations
question the merits of the widely used model in Poterba (1984).2 In his model, the turnover
level is una¤ected during the adjustment process after a shock, since sales occur instantly
and without friction. The motive for research is that the presence of frictions in the housing
market is associated with costs for the individual as well as for society, since it prevents
the price from falling, so that turnover would remain at a constant level. A well-functioning
housing market shouldprovide an adequate turnover of residential property of various tenure
types, thereby assisting economic agents in accumulating an appropriate asset portfolio to
…nance life-cycle consumption plans. A housing market with relatively little friction –in
terms of shorter sales duration and less costly search – may also assist job mobility and the
e¢cient matching of jobs within the labor market, thereby promoting business enterprises.
Several explanations for the observed ‡uctuating turnover and the correlation between
average prices and turnover have been suggested. Case and Schiller (1989) argued that
the rational response in a falling market is to hold on to existing housing investments in
anticipation of positive future returns. Stein (1995) suggested that data regularities gave
some support for down-payment requirements and other borrowing constraints. Wheaton
(1990) suggested that sellers’ reservation prices were partly determined by their expectations
about sales duration and the cost of holding two units, since sellers were, in fact, buyers
seeking to dispose of their old home. Berkovec and Goodman (1996) argued that while the
1 For instance, using US nation-wide monthly data, covering the period 1968-1992, Stein (1995), found the
contemporary price-turnover correlation to be positive, and also that the turnover of houses was positively
related to changes in the price level. In periods of a rising (falling) market price, there was also a higher
(lower) turnover in the housing markets.
2 See Åsberg and Åsbrink (1998) and Agell et al. (1998) for a study of the capitalization e¤ects in the
market for owner-occupied housing resulting from the 1991 Swedish tax reform. In this framework, house
prices are forward looking and solely depend on price fundamentals, i.e., user cost of capital, rents, and
construction costs.
2contemporary price-turnover correlationshouldbe positivein lowfrequency data(i.e., annual
or quarterly), it might well be negative in high frequency data (i.e., weekly or monthly). If
sellers have an information lag as compared to buyers, buyers respond more rapidly to
demand shocks. This would cause the number of sales to respond more quickly than the
mean prices, due to changes in demand. Therefore, turnover should be superior to the mean
price as an indication of changes in demand in high frequency data.
The theoretical research that has tried to explain the observed empirical pattern has
focused on the microeconomic underpinning of the observable data. It is therefore important
to consider the quality of the aggregated data – turnover and price level – that have been
used to test the microeconomic behavior of agents. In empirical tests, the price level is either
measuredas the average or the median selling price. Hence, the price measure is functionally
related to the turnover measure.
In this paper, we (i) discuss some general conditions when the data generating process
(DGP) does not result in mean independence between the price level and turnover, due to
the functional dependence between these two measures. We also (ii) clarify some of the
di¢culties in using aggregated data to test the underlying micro behavior of agents in the
housing market.
The problem of aggregationhasbeen exploredfrom various viewpoints. Ourpaper should
be viewed as a contribution to the part of the prior literature that examined the e¤ects of
failing toempirically incorporate heterogeneity across sub-groups into theaggregate analysis.
Some of the prominent authors pursuing this approach are Theil (1954), Grun…eld and
Griliches (1960) and Stoker (1986). (See Shumway and Davis (2001) for a broad survey of
the aggregation literature in general and inferential errors due to aggregation in agricultural
economics in particular.)
Our results are the following. (i) The observed price-turnover correlation using aggre-
gated data may be a result of the aggregation. (ii) The sign and the magnitude of the
aggregation bias are in general undetermined, since they depend on the cross-sectional het-
erogeneity in price levels and responses to demand shocks. The average price for houses sold
3in a speci…c time period does not only re‡ect tendencies in the general price level, but will
also depend on the composition of houses sold. If, for instance, the number of sales in a
high-priced sub-market expands relatively more – as compared to a low-priced sub-market –
as a result of an expansion in the demand for housing, then the observed aggregate average
price will be positively correlated with the observed aggregate number of sales. (iii) The
prospect of …nding empirical support for various hypotheses suggested in the literature will
depend on the level of aggregation, since aggregation will have a ‡attening e¤ect on non-zero
correlations present at disaggregated levels (i.e. attenuation bias).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and presents
some empirical regularities in the data. In Section 3, the DGP of mean prices and turnover
are discussed. The empirical implications and considerations of using aggregated price-
turnover data are discussed in section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Review of literature and empirical regularities
Stein (1995) suggested that the positive correlation between house prices and turnover in
housing is systematic and couldbe duetoliquidity constraints for the buyer. Aninitial shock
that knocks prices down, weakens the ability of would-be movers to make down payments
on new homes. As house prices fall, some potential movers …nd their liquidity to be so
impaired that they are better o¤ staying in their old home than moving to a new, smaller
home. Mismatched low-liquidity house-owners may start ”…shing”; i.e., listing their house
at an above market price and thereby accepting longer waiting times, in a (low-probability)
hope of receiving enough money for a reasonable down payment on a new home. Given that
the alternative to …shing is not moving at all, the opportunity cost of …shing is low. In times
when prices are high, …shing is less attractive since mismatched house-owners can move to
the desired home with a shorter waiting time and higher certainty. This should suggest that
the trading volume (or the inverse of the length of time on the market) will be positively
related to the price level. Not reducing reservation prices su¢ciently in falling markets
implies that the turnover should fall when the price level is low. Using empirical micro-data,
4Henley (1998) found that negative housing equity had a negative e¤ect on mobility.
Wheaton (1990) introduced costly search and uncertainty and studied the impact of
the cost of holding two units on the behavior of sellers and buyers in a search theoretical
framework. He assumed that the number of units and the number of households were
…xed in the short run, and that the prospect of remaining mismatched in the current home
determined both the search e¤ort and the o¤er price made by buyers. In his model, sellers
are also buyers whohave found a newunit and are trying todispose oftheir old house. Their
reservation prices are determined by expectations about sales time and the cost of holding
two units. A higher vacancy rate (i.e., the number of houses up for sale per household) will
increase the average sales time (i.e., the inverse of the number of sales). This will also reduce
sellers’ reservation prices and lead to lower observed market prices. Wheaton also expected
a positive relation between prices and the number of sales.
Using monthly US national data from 1968:2-1993:2, Berkovec and Goodman (1996)
noted that (i) changes in sales were positively related to changes in aggregated housing
demand, that (ii) the positive price-turnover correlation was strongest in low frequency data
and that (iii) sales seemed to respond more quickly to changes in housing demand than
the price level. Berkovec and Goodman argued that these observations were consistent with
sellers having an information lag as compared to buyers and that buyers therefore responded
more rapidly to demand shocks. Initially, a demand shock would only a¤ect the number of
buyers or their willingness to pay. Hence, turnover would react more quickly to changes in
demand than aggregate price movements. The predictive power of turnover in measuring
demand ‡uctuations would therefore be superior to that of prices, at least in high frequency
data, where there might well be a negative price-turnover correlation.3
The empirical results reported in the literature are not uniform, however. Follain and
Velz (1995) reported that house prices and turnover were negatively related. Their empir-
3 Hort (2000) found support for the statements made by Berkovec and Goodman in Swedish data. To
test the hypothesis of a slow adjustment for sellers, she estimated impuls-response functions from a three-
dimensional VAR model, with the after-tax mortgage rate, turnover and price. In monthly, but not in
quarterly, data turnover reacts faster than prices to a shock in the after-tax mortgage rate. She did not






































































































































































































Figure 1: Mean real selling price per square meter (nominal price/CPI 1980) and turnover
in sales of single-family houses, Stockholm municipality, 1981:Q1-2000:Q2
ical approach di¤ers from Stein’s in two ways. They estimated a structural model of the
housing market with four simultaneously determined equations (real constant-quality price
level, turnover, housing quality index, and housing stock). Furthermore, they used annual
disaggregated data, spanning over 22 US metropolitan areas during 1986-1992.
2.1 Some empirical evidence for Sweden
For the twomajor metropolitanmunicipalities in Sweden, we can also …nd somesupport for a
negative correlationbetweenthe level of housing prices andthe level of sales. Figures 1 and2
show the mean real price per square meter (pt) and turnover (qt) in the single-family housing
market in Stockholm and Gothenburg, respectively.4 The raw correlation coe¢cients for
quarterly data (1981:1-2000:2) are ¡0:12 for Stockholm and ¡0:25 for Gothenburg. The
correlations are most pronounced in the time period before 1991 with ¡0:37 for Stockholm
and ¡0:51 for Gothenburg while, in the period after 1991, the correlations are almost zero.
The raw correlations between the recent change in house prices and turnover level are,
4 The data used in this chapter was collected by the National Land Survey of Sweden (Lantmäteriet).
The data cover almost one million sales of single-family houses. It consist of the mean per square meter
selling price and the number of sales for single-family houses in all of 289 municipalities. The data frequency






























































































































































































Figure 2: Mean real selling price per square meter (nominal price/CPI 1980) and turnover



























































































































































































Figure 3: Percentage annual change in mean real selling price per square meter (nominal




























































































































































































Figure 4: Percentage annual change in mean real selling price per square meter (nominal
price/CPI 1980) and (the log of) turnover in sales of single-family houses, Gothenburg mu-
nicipality, 1981:1-2000:2
however, positive, with0:21 for Stockholm and0:34 for Gothenburg. Theselatter correlations
support Stein’s (1995) hypothesis, but that is not the case with the …rst correlations based
on the levels. Figures 3 and 4 plot the annual percentage change in real house prices per
square meter and the number of sales (in logs) for the two municipalities.5
The raw correlation is, however, not without demur when it comes to drawing convincing
inference about, e.g., Stein’s (1995) hypothesis. First, the raw correlation does not control
for a number of background variables. Second, one might suspect that there is a substantial
amount of heterogeneity across regions and time periods for which the raw correlation above
does not account.
In order to, at least partly, accommodate these objections, we run a series of regression
models with various speci…cations. First, we regress the mean real price per square meter (in
logs) on turnover (alsoinlogs) (henceforth level-vs.-level). In our second model speci…cation,
we instead use the annual percentage change in real price per square meter as the dependent
variable (henceforth di¤erence-vs.-level). These speci…cations explore data along the lines of
Stein’s (1995) argument. In the third model speci…cation, we regress the annual percentage
5 The annual percentage change of the mean real price is computed as ln pt ¡ ln pt¡4.
8Table 1: Slope estimates from models with one common slope parameter using municipal




















Observations 22206 21015 21015 1632
N 289 21
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses. Quarterly e¤ects and
…xed time e¤ects included. (1)-(3): The number of parameters
(including a municipal factor) are 367. (4): The number of parameters
(including a county factor) are 99.
change in real price per square meter as the dependent variable and the annual percentage
change in turnover as the independent variable (henceforth di¤erence-vs.-di¤erence).6
The estimated slope coe¢cients (and t-values) are given in Table 1. We …nd the slope
coe¢cient estimates to be positive and signi…cant, and almost exactly the same in all three
model speci…cations. According to these results, data seem to give a very uniform picture of
the price-turnover correlation. The positive estimate in columns (1) and (2) seem to con…rm
Stein’s (1995) …nding of a positive price-turnover correlation and that the turnover of houses
and recent changes in the price level are positively related.
However, a quite di¤erent and very irregular description of the data concerning these
relationships arises if we drop the restriction of a single common slope parameter for all
municipalities, andinsteadalloweach municipality tohave its own separate slope coe¢cient.7
6 In all speci…cations, mean price and turnover are measured for each municipality. In the regressions,
we include all 289 municipalities for 1981:1-2000:2. Furthermore, we include quarterly …xed e¤ects to adjust
for seasonal e¤ects, …xed municipality intercepts to allow for cross-sectional heterogeneity in the price levels,
and …xed time e¤ects to control for the in‡uence of common demand and supply conditions.
9Figure 5 plots the estimated municipality-speci…c slope coe¢cients from the level-vs.-level
speci…cation against the county a¢liation code.8 Here the signi…cance level is indicated at
the 5 percent level. It is clear that the model with a uniform slope parameter is a feeble
description of data. For the greater part of the sample, the turnover level has no signi…cant
in‡uence on the price level. Only 22 out of the 289 slope estimates are signi…cantly positive
and 35 signi…cantly negative at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, the spread in the slope
estimates varies substantially over di¤erent parts of the country. The spread of the estimates
for the municipalities mainly located in the western part of the country (county a¢liation
codes 14, 17 and 18) is considerable. Thesigni…cant estimates are bothpositiveandnegative,
but there is a clear dominance towards positive ones. In the rest of Sweden, signi…cant
estimates are mainly negative. In the southern parts of the country (county a¢liation codes
10 and 12), all signi…cant estimates are negative and some are quite large.
We repeat this exercise for the di¤erence-vs.-level and di¤erence-vs.-di¤erence speci…-
cations (see Figures 6 and 7, respectively, with the signi…cance level is indicated at the 5
percent level). Once more, we conclude that there is a substantial amount of dispersion
in these relationships, and that the uniform estimates given in Table 1 give a fairly poor
description of these relationships in the data. Almost all slope estimates are insigni…cant.
In the di¤erence-vs.-level regression, we note that almost all signi…cant estimates represent
a positive relationship (33 signi…cantly positive and 3 signi…cantly negative estimates). In
the di¤erence-vs.-di¤erence speci…cation, we …nd a slight dominance towards positive ones
(28 signi…cantly positive and 20 signi…cantly negative estimates). The dispersion in the es-
timates over di¤erent parts of the country from both these speci…cations is similar to that
7 The model is a least square dummy variable model. In this regression, we interact turnover with the
municipality dummies, but otherwise keep the speci…cation intact as compared to that in Table 1. A robust
covariance estimator (White, 1980) is used to calculate the t-values. The number of observations is 22206
and the number of parameters is 655:
8 The county a¢liation code classi…cation is Stockholms län (1), Uppsala län (3), Södermanlands län (4),
Östergötlands län (5), Jönköpings län (6), Kronobergs län (7), Kalmar län (8), Gotlands län (9), Blekinge
län (10), Skåne län (12), Hallands län (13), Västra Götalands län (14), Värmlands län (17), Örebro län (18),
Västmanlands län (19), Dalarnas län (20), Gävleborgs län (21), Västernorrlands län (22), Jämtlands län
(23), Västerbottens län (24), Norrbottens län (25).
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Figure 5: Slope coe¢cients, signi…cant (¤) on the 5 percent level and insigni…cant (±), on
the y-axis, from a regression with real price per square metre (in logs) as the dependent and
turnover (in logs) as the independent variable, and the county code on the x-axis (level-vs.-
level speci…cation).
of the level-vs.-level speci…cation.
Taken together, these exercises clearly show that there is a substantial amount of hetero-
geneity between di¤erent parts of Sweden, and that neglecting these irregularities may cause
incorrect inferences. Considering the spread and the small part of signi…cant estimates in
Figures 5, 6 and 7, it is likely that the results in Table 1 are driven by a relatively small
fraction of outliers, and that they depend on how we divide the sample into di¤erent time
periods and which regions of the country are included.
Di¤erent authors have used di¤erent levels of aggregation to study these relationships (cf.
the review in this section). However, the level of aggregation will in‡uence inference. We
illustratethis by aggregating themunicipal data, which weusedabove, upto thecounty level.
In the latest county classi…cation, Sweden’s 289 municipalities are geographically classi…ed
into 21 counties. We re-estimate our level-vs.-level model with the same model structure
as before that allows for county-speci…c slope parameters, and instead use the county level
data.9
9 The aggregated mean price in county c at time t is calculated as ¹ pct =
P
m qmt¹ pmt =
P
m qmt; and the
11COUNTY AFFILIATION CODE
 SIGNIFICANT  INSIGNIFICANT










Figure 6: Slope coe¢cients, signi…cant on the 5 percent level (¤) and insigni…cant (±), on
the y-axis, from a regression with the annual percentage change in real price per square
metre as the dependent and turnover (in logs) as the independent variable, and the county
code on the x-axis (di¤erence-vs.-level speci…cation).
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Figure 7: Slope coe¢cients, signi…cant on the 5 percent level (¤) and insigni…cant (±), on
the y-axis, from a regression with the annual percentage change in real price per square
metre as the dependent and the annual percentage change in turnover as the independent
variable, and the county code on the x-axis (di¤erence-vs.-di¤erence speci…cation).
12We present the estimated slope coe¢cients from this exercise in Figure 8. If inference
is more or less independent of the aggregation level, the relative position of estimates and
levels of signi…cance from this regression should be roughly the same as those presented in
Figure 5. A few things can be noted. First, it is obvious that in absolute terms, there is
much less dispersion at the county level than at the municipal level. The aggregation over
municipalities smoothens the estimates found at the municipality level, which is what should
be expected due to the in‡uence of the attenuation bias. Second, a larger share of the slope
coe¢cient estimates in the county sample are signi…cant as compared to those in the mu-
nicipality sample. For 21 counties, 6 estimates are signi…cantly negative, 1 is signi…cantly
positive and the rest (14 counties) are insigni…cant. Third, the varying dispersion of signif-
icant estimates over di¤erent parts of the country only agrees with what was found at the
municipal level in some cases (in Figure 5). The negative (and signi…cant) estimates in the
southern parts of the country (county a¢liation codes 10 and 12) match relatively well with
what was found when using the municipality data. However, the estimates for the western
parts of the country (county a¢liation codes 14, 17 and 18) are practically zero. When using
the municipality level, we found quite high and positive estimates in those regions which are
obviously wiped out in the more aggregated data. Fourth, estimating a common slope for
all counties using the county level results in a somewhat lower estimate as compared to the
corresponding estimate on municipality level data. The point estimate is positive, however,
insigni…cant (See Table 1, column (4); for details).10
aggregated turnover is qct =
P
m qmt; where ¹ pmt is the mean price in municipality m at time t; and qmt is
the turnover in municipality m at time t: We estimate the level-vs.-level model on a county level with the
real price per square meter (in logs) as the dependent variable and turnover (also in logs) interacted with
the county a¢liation code as independent variables. We include dummies for quarter, county and time. A
robust covariance estimator (White, 1980) is used to calculate t-values. The number of observations is 1632,
and the number of parameters is 119:
10 The result in Hort (2000), who also used Swedish county level data, deviates from our result in this
respect. She presented (in Table 1) a negative and signi…cant point estimate from a model with one common
slope parameter for all counties. She used quarterly data from a slightly di¤erent time period than ours,
however (1982:3-1996:2). She used …xed time and …xed county e¤ects, but did not include …xed seasonal
e¤ects. Instead, she used data series on turnover, which were seasonally adjusted series by cross-sectional
unit-speci…c seasonal dummies. Constant quality house price indexes were also used (see Hort (2000) for
details).
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Figure 8: County data. Slope coe¢cients, signi…cant on the 5 percent level (¤) and insignif-
icant (±), on the y-axis, from a regression with the real price per square metre (in logs) as
the dependent and turnover (in logs) as the independent variable, and the county code on
the x-axis (level-vs.-level speci…cation).
Once more, the time-period chosen for study and the counties included would a¤ect
the results. It is, however, obvious that aggregation can substantially change inference. Our
example of aggregating the price and turnover data from the municipality level to the county
level shows the familiar result ofan attenuation bias in aggregateddata. Next, wediscuss the
DGP for the average price and turnover. In the following section, we give analytical results
of the aggregation bias of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, given the assumptions
of the DGP.
3 Price and quantity formation
To validate di¤erent hypotheses about the microeconomic behavior of agents in the housing
market (e.g., asymmetric demand shock responses of buyers vis-à-vis sellers (Berkovec and
Goodman, 1996), or costly search and uncertainty (Wheaton, 1990)), it is most common for
researchers to test ﬂ 6= 0 in one of the three model speci…cations given by
¹ p
¤
t = ﬁ(xt) +ﬂq
¤
t + "t; (1)
14where f¹ p¤
t;q¤
tgis either f¹ pt;qtg;f¢¹ pt;qtg orf¢¹ pt;¢qtg; and ¢ is thetime di¤erence operator.





jt is the average price, where pR
jt is the realized
selling price of the j:th house sold during a speci…c time period. xt is a vector of explanatory
variables, which are presumably correlated with qt. For simplicity, we let ﬁ(xt) = ﬁ in the
following. With reference to the former section, these three speci…cations hence correspond
to the level-vs.-level, di¤erence-vs.-level and di¤erence-vs.-di¤erence speci…cations except
that ¹ pt and qt are not in logarithms. Note that ﬁ and ﬂ are not necessarily the same in the
three speci…cations.
Consider estimating(1) usingOLS.The meanindependence ofqt or¢qt and"t is su¢cient
for the OLS estimator to be consistent (i.e. E("tjqt) = E("tj¢qt) = 0). Since the mean
price is functionally dependent on the number of houses sold, it is of interest to discuss
the assumptions needed on the DGP to implement tests of structural dependence using the
above speci…cations, i.e. what assumptions on the DGP are needed for qt or ¢qt to be mean
independent with "t in (1) above?
The frequent assumption in the literature about the DGP is that a house sale is not
frictionless. A search theoretical framework is quite often used to model the process of a
house sale; it is costly and takes time to carry out since it takes time for a seller to …nd the
right buyer, for a buyer to …nd the right house, and for the seller and buyer to agree upon
the price.
Consider a housing market with a constant and homogeneous housing stock H, where
each house-owner owns one unit of the housing good. At each t, a house-owner decides
whether to enter the market and become a seller at a given separation rate. Seller j sets a
reservation price, …jt. The distribution of reservation prices at t is described by F¦(…t):11
Assume that the decision to sell cannot be revoked.
The bid distribution (generated by the populationof buyers) is FP (pt). Bids are assumed
11 The reservation price …jt can be derived - under assumptions of exogenous separation and o¤er rate
- using a search theoretical framework. The spread in the reservation price distribution F¦(…t) can be
motivated by the fact that sellers may be heterogeneous in their motivation to sell (see also Glower et al.,
1998), or by duration dependence (see, e.g., Sirmans et al., 1995).
15to arrive at the o¤er rate ‚t. A seller sells if the incoming bid is greater than his reservation
price. The resulting price realization when a sale goes through, pR
jt; depends on the buyer’s
and seller’s information about the market. We will discuss this below.
To enhance the presentation, let ﬂ ´ 0. Now, if E(¹ ptjqt) = E(¹ pt) (or E(¹ ptj¢qt) = E(¹ pt)),
then "t and qt (or ¢qt) in (1) are mean independent. Thus, the bias of the OLS estimator is











t ) for all j = 1;:::;qt; then E(¹ ptjqt) = E(¹ pt) and the bias of the
OLS estimator is zero. The meaning of the condition E(¹ ptjqt) = E(¹ pt) is that the ordering of
the sales is of no importance. Selling an additional unit or a unit less, given that some units
are sold, does not alter the expected mean selling price. If the ordering is of importance for
E(¹ ptjqt), then ¹ pt and qt are mean dependent, even if ﬂ ´ 0:
We can express this formally by ordering the sales in the natural order, with j = 1
being the …rst house sold and j = qt the last house sold during a speci…c time period. The
































jtjk) is the expected value of the j:th house sold, given that k sales occurred, and
Pr(k) is the probability that k sales occur. Thus, if E(pR
jtjk) is independent of the ordering
of sales, the expected value of the last house sold is not di¤erent from that of the houses
sold before. The average price and turnover are mean independent and E(¹ ptjqt) = E(¹ pt).
Whether this is true in reality is an open question. It will depend on the friction in the
homogenous market; how well-informed buyers are about the reservation prices they meet
and how well-informed sellers are about incoming bids.
16Consider the extreme situation where a buyer has perfect knowledge about individual
reservation prices. He would place his bid pit = …jt and buy immediately. Then, the
matching is not random, since buyers would search for the cheapest possible house. The
…rst house to be sold would be the cheapest, the second house would be the second cheapest,




E(¹ ptjqt) 6= E(¹ pt) and the bias of the OLS estimator is di¤erent from zero.13 Observe that
this extreme situation of asymmetric information and no market is not likely to occur in
real life. We have assumed that there is no competition for houses on the market and that
buyers are perfectly informed about all prices, whereas sellers are not.
A more relevant situation is if sellers announce list prices, or asking prices, which are
knownto thebuyer. (A list price indicates the seller’s intent, andgives the buyer further, but
not perfect, knowledge about …jt:)14 This situation is likely to introduce mean dependence
between "t and qt or ¢qt; hence biasing the estimate of ﬂ above.
Thus, even though the average price and turnover are functionally related, it is possible
to test structural relations, given speci…c restrictions on the DGP. If every house-seller meets
the same distribution of bids and the o¤er rate ‚t is the same for all sellers, the bid size and
the bid o¤er rate are independent. If buyers pay according to their personal valuation of the




i.e. the mean accepted o¤er price. If buyers have perfect knowledge of individual reservation
prices, the corresponding expected price is the mean reservation price, i.e. E(pR
jt) = E(…t):
It is worth noting that if the reservation price distribution is degenerated (i.e. one point)
and E(pR
jt) = E(…t) (either because buyers do not pay according to their personal valuation
or the reservation price is known), then "t and qt or ¢qt are mean independent.
12 Holds if F¦ is not a single-point distribution.
13 Introducing list prices into the model would alter the seller’s bid distribution and the probability of
receiving an o¤er, as argued in Horowitz (1992). This would introduce a correlation between the o¤er rate
and bids and create a dependence between turnover and the mean selling price.
14 Horowitz (1992) argued that list prices appeared to be price ceilings above which no bids arrived, and
that higher list prices reduced the probability of recieving an o¤er.
17In this section, we have – given a quite general framework of price and turnover forma-
tion – discussed the possibilities of testing structural hypotheses based on ﬂ in the regression
models above and the implications for the DGP. One implication is random shopping which
was, for instance, the identifying assumption in Berkovec and Goodman (1996) when they
tested a hypothesis of slow adjustment of sellers vis-à-vis buyers. In their model, the reser-
vation price distribution was obtained from a negative market duration dependence of the
reservation price. Under the assumption of random shopping, other structural hypotheses
can be tested using the above regressions.15 ;16 Furthermore, note that if we exchange the
mean price for the median price (pm
t ) in equation (2), we will obtain the same results as
above.17
4 Empirical considerations
In this section, we will consider estimations and testing of the structural relationships (1)
using aggregated data. Assume that we have data on prices and turnover at the municipal
level and that the housing market in the municipality consists of A di¤erent, but perfectly
homogenous, areas (a). Let pR
kat be the realized price in sale k = 1;:::;qat; in area a in the
















15 The presence of non-random shopping (i.e. some form of asymmetric information or no market) is
naturally a structural hypothesis that it would be of interest to test.
16 Observe that "t and qt are statistically dependent also under the assumption of random shopping,
although mean independent. This is easily seen from calculating the variance: V ar("t) = ￿2q¡1
t ; where
￿2 = Var("jt):
17 This follows by exchanging ¹ pt with pm
























jt jk ¡ 1) Pr(k ¡ 1);
where pRm
kt is the observed median price, given k sales.





kat is the average price in area a; pR
kat is the realized selling price
of the k:th house sold in area a (where E(pR
kat) = „a; according to Section 3, and „a is a
parameter), qt =
PA
a=1qat is the aggregate turnover, and `at = qat=qt is the proportion of
total sales in area a.
Let us consider the problem of aggregate data by specifying a simple structural relation-
ship at the area level. The average price level in area a is speci…ed as
¹ pat = ﬁa + ﬂqat +"at;
where qat is the turnover.18 Observe that if ﬂ = 0; then ﬁa = „a: Here "at is, by assumption,
mean independent of qat. Hence, if data are available at the disaggregated level, an unbiased
inference using OLS is possible.
Now, consider estimating
pt = ﬁ + ﬂqt + "t
with OLS. Let q: = 1
T
PT
t=1qt be the mean turnover for the period studied and assume that
Qqq = plim 1
T
PT
t=1(qt ¡ q:)2 exists. The OLS slope estimate will converge in probability to





















































18 The result from aggregation when using this model can easily be extended to the other two models
(given in equation 1). The result from this is qualitatively the same as the results below.
19Since
PT


















it is evident that • < 1: Hence, if ﬂ 6= 0, the OLS estimate of the slope will be attenuated
by aggregation.19 It is interesting to note that the aggregation bias occurs for two di¤erent
reasons: attenuation bias emerges since • < 1 and structural bias (i.e. – 6= 0) arises if
the areas are heterogeneous in (i) price levels (i.e. ﬁa 6= ﬁ for some a = 1;:::;A) and (ii)
responses to market shocks. Thus, even if there is no structural dependence (i.e. ﬂ = 0);
the OLS estimator may be biased.









= (ﬁ2 ¡ ﬁ1)Cq`V
¡1
qq = (ﬁ2 ¡ ﬁ1)b ﬂq`;
where Cq` is the covariance between `2t and qt, Vqq is the variance of qt and b ﬂq` is the OLS
parameter in a regression of `2t on qt.
Hence, if theexpected price levels in the two areas are equal (ﬁ1 = ﬁ2); or theproportions
of the turnovers for the areas (of the total turnover) remain unchanged over the period
studied, there will be no structural bias.
Suppose instead that area 2 consists of high-priced housing and area 1 of low-priced
housing, i.e. ﬁ2 > ﬁ1, and that the overall turnover increases gradually over time due to a
positive demand shock20 and that this increase is mainly due to a gradual increase in the
sales in the high-priced area 2, i.e. b ﬂq` > 0. Then, the estimate will be positively biased
i.e., – > 0. The intuition is that the high-priced area 2 gradually attains a higher weight
in the aggregated mean price function. Consequently, qt and pt will be positively correlated,
even though qat and pat are mean independent. If, instead, trade in the high-priced area 2
19 Note that the estimated correlation may even change signs since • is not bounded from below.
20 This shock can e.g. be caused by changes in user cost and exogenous changes in demand (e.g. due to
changes in the demographic factors).
20increases at a slower rate as compared to the low-priced area 1, then, by the same reasoning,
qt and pt will be negatively correlated and – < 0. The structural bias can be exempli…ed
with a similar reasoning for A > 2 and for the other two model speci…cations.21
Considering equation (4), it can be noticed that the results of aggregation bias do not
depend on how the aggregate price is calculated (i.e. using the mean or the median price).
This is the case since – results from `at and qt being correlated (and ﬁa 6= ﬁ for some
a = 1;:::;A) and • stems from the inequality (7). Hence, both • and – are independent of
the aggregate price measure.
Figure 9 gives an illustration of the aggregation bias for, arbitrarily set, – = 0:2 and • =
0:6. In the origin of the coordinates, there is no structural dependence at the disaggregated
homogeneous level. The point estimate is, however, positive since market shocks have a
relatively larger e¤ect on high-priced than on low-priced areas. Furthermore, we can see
that the size of the bias is a function of the true slope parameter. The bias is reduced
(increased) if the true structural dependence between the average price and turnover at the
disaggregated level is positive (negative). If the true slope is 0:5, these parameters suggest
that there is no bias. However, had we chosen – to be ¡0:2; thereby assuming that market
shocks have a relatively lower e¤ect on high-priced as compared to low-priced areas, the bias
would be zero for ﬂ = ¡0:5: The regression estimates based on aggregated data may hence
not be very informative about the true structural dependence.












where, by assumption, "jat is identical independent distributed (iid) with the variance ￿2
a
and hence,






21 The derivation of the bias above naturally depends on the DGP at the area level. Hence, the results
from aggregation using the two other speci…cations depend on the assumed DGP. If the DGP has the same
functional form as the model estimated at the aggregate level, then exactly the same result is obtained on
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Figure 9: The estimate ^ ﬂ, the true ﬂ and the bias as a function of ﬂ with – = 0:2 and
• = 0:6:
Thus, we will have heteroscedasticity and a feasible GLS estimator or a robust covariance
estimator should be used in order to obtain the correct sizes.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the properties of macro economic data – the price level and the number
of sales – in the housing market and the consequences of aggregation. In the literature,
structural hypothesis tests of the contemporary relationship between the price level and
turnover (or between functions of these measures) are most often implemented using linear
regression analysis. However, considering that the price level is functionally dependent on
turnover since it is either measured as theaverage or the median selling price, it important to
consider and discuss the realism of the implications necessary for the DGP for implementing
tests of structural dependence.
It is possible to test structural hypotheses using the contemporary relationship between
the price level and turnover, given a quite general search theoretical framework where buyers
shop around among houses up for sale in a random fashion (i.e. all house sellers are assumed
22to receive bids – from the same distribution of bids – at random). Data on prices and
turnover may, however, only be availablefor a large market, where the assumptionof random
shopping can then be questioned. The regression estimator using these data for estimating
the price turnover dependence is consequently likely to be biased. Another way of studying
the consequences of non-random shopping is to consider it as an aggregation problem. We
canassume random shoppingto holdat some disaggregated level.22 The datamay, however,
only beavailableat theaggregatelevel, whichwill leadtoaggregation bias. The twoproblems
– realism of the assumptions necessary for the DGP for implementing tests of structural
dependence and aggregation – are really two di¤erent ways of studying the same issue:
when is it possible to use aggregated data to test for structural dependence?
The correlation between aggregated data on the price level and turnover has been em-
pirically investigated by several authors at di¤erent levels of aggregation, both over cross-
sectional units and time periods, but the reported results are not very uniform (cf. Section
2). In this paper, we suggest that a plausible explanation of the disparate empirical …ndings
in the literature is the low quality of data caused by aggregation over heterogenous areas.
In line with the prior aggregation literature, we show that aggregation bias is induced if
the aggregate analysis fails to empirically incorporate heterogeneity across sub-groups. The
theoretical suggestions are supported by empirical …ndings using Swedish longitudinal data
of 289 municipalities during 1981:1-2000:2, containing the mean real price per square meter
and turnover in the single-family housing market. There is a substantial amount of hetero-
geneity between di¤erent parts of Sweden and over time, and neglecting these irregularities
may cause the wrong inference.
The motive for research has been to gather knowledge of the functionality of the housing
market since frictions are associated with high costs for the individual as well as for society
in terms of sales duration and costly search. The observed correlations (both negative and
positive) between the price level and sales found in the literature may hence not necessarily
22 In order to make the assumption of random shopping reliable, the size of disaggregated areas can be
made as small as necessary. Each house may in fact constitute an area.
23be due to di¤erent forms of ine¢ciency in the second-hand housing market as has been
suggestedby the authors. It may equally well be the e¤ect of an aggregation of heterogenous
sub-markets.
The average price for houses sold during a speci…c time period does not only re‡ect
tendencies in the general price level, but also depends on the composition of houses sold.
Data for the homogeneous area would enable the researcher to test structural relationships
without restrictive assumptions about the DGP. It is, however, reasonable to assume that
the turnover is low, since the size of such areas is likely to be small, thereby causing estimates
of the relationship to be imprecise. One way of gaining e¢ciency would be by pooling the
data over the areas and making use of estimated hedonic prices (see, e.g. Englund, et al.,
1998) to accommodate for heterogeneity (between the areas) in the price levels.
However, both the assumption of homogenous areas in empirical data and the methods
of hedonic price functions can be questioned; the former since homogeneous areas (of a
reasonable size) simply do not exist and the latter for not accommodating all heterogeneity.
There are also other concerns – connected to the aggregation problem, however – with the
use of aggregated data. Spatially distinct housing markets arise from geographical …xity as
well as from heterogeneity in physical characteristics of houses and in local ways of providing
public goods (see Fratantoni and Schuh, 1999). The price level and turnover dependence
can, therefore, be caused by a vast number of structural relations that may also change
over time or across pooled units. The reliability of macro economic data can be further
questioned, considering the empirical evidence suggested in several studies of in‡uential
patterns of contiguity dependence.23
There are di¤erent forms of ine¢ciencies in the second-hand housing market. It may
be di¢cult to study one kind of ine¢ciency using aggregated data simply because other
23 See Burgess and Pro…t (2001) for a study of spatial externalities in the labor market. They studied
externalities between neighboring travel-to-work areas with respect to the matching of workers and …rms
in Great Britain and found signi…cant spill-over e¤ects between such areas. Pollakowski and Ray (1997)
studied price-ripple e¤ects in the US housing market. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and Meen (1997)
studied this issue for the US. Berg (2000) studied Sweden, and found signi…cant price ripple e¤ects between
regional housing markets.
24ine¢ciencies may attenuate the e¤ect of, e.g., changes in user costs. Take the tax system as
an example. In Sweden, there is a proportional tax for registering a new house ownership
(stamp duty).24 This tax makes it moreexpensivetomove, hence it will reduce the turnover
rate. The correlation between mean prices and turnover would be zero – under the DGP
described above – however. The tax would make it harder to …nd signi…cant correlations
between mean price and turnover, simply because real changes in user cost are smaller than
nominal changes.
To truly gain an understanding of structural relationships, it is essential to have micro-
data at the individual or household level.
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